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THE CONCEPT OF PREFERENCE AND
ITS MANIFESTATION IN HUNGARIAN
VERBAL CONFLICT SEQUENCES*
ágnes lerch
Preference is an operative notion of sequential organization and interpersonal under-
standing in conversation analysis. The complexity of the phenomenon that we are
attempting to grasp through this notion has manifested itself in the seemingly contro-
versial widening of the interpretation of the notion. In this paper I argue that prefer-
ence can be interpreted through an inference rule as a consequence of the simultaneous
but not equal manifestation of pragmatic principles; a deeper and uncontroversial in-
terpretation of the notion is possible if, in addition to a structural inference rule and
interpersonality principles, we take into consideration the role of rationality principles
as well. In every communicative situation an interpersonal concern and a topical con-
cern is operative; in consensus-oriented contexts preference structure is regulated by
interpersonality principles that govern interpersonal relations and self-projection, while
in conflict-oriented discourse the most important role is played by rationality princi-
ples. Approaching preference from the perspective of pragmatic principles may prove
instrumental in integrating conversation analysis more closely with new directions and
results of pragmatic research.
1. Aims
In this paper I attempt to clarify the nature of preference, considering
that the use of this classical concept of conversation analysis (CA) which
has an important part in interpreting utterances seems to have become
confused and vague in the course of time. After reviewing the role of
preference in CA in 2.1, in 2.2 through 2.5 I provide a critical survey of
the interpretations of the term in the pragmatics literature. As a result of
a reconsideration of the approaches at this issue, in 2.6 I suggest a com-
plex interpretation of preference which unifies the different views from
the perspective of pragmatic principles. In section 3, I investigate the
manifestation of preference organization in verbal conflict sequences. In
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this part of this paper I argue that in order to grasp the nature of prefer-
ence it is essential to investigate forms of agreements and disagreements
in conflict talk. Section 4 summarizes the results.
2. The concept of preference
2.1. The scope of preference
Preference (preference organization) is a key analytical concept of CA,
operative both in description and intersubjective understanding, because
it is concerned with how actions are constituted and responded to, and
how intersubjective understanding is achieved.
According to the CA literature, preference regulates, first of all, the
choice among alternative but nonequivalent second parts of adjacency
pairs, as well as the interpretation of the realized turns (Levinson 1983;
Heritage 1984; Pomerantz 1984; Sacks 1995a;b). Although actions pro-
duced as first parts of adjacency pairs allow different reactions, they
evoke expectations for specific preferred seconds. When the preferred
alternative is not taken, it is experienced as being relevantly absent. Its
noticeable absence is routinely used as a basis for inferences.
Preference is referred to as one of the most important discoveries of
CA, because it was central to the classic, early work on repair (Moerman
1977; Schegloff et al. 1977), responses to compliments (Pomerantz 1978),
the organization of reference to others (Sacks–Schegloff 1979), responses
to accusations (Atkinson–Drew 1979), and the placement of agreements
(Sacks 1987).
As Pomerantz (1984) points out in her research into some features
of second assessments in everyday friendly conversations, agreements are
the preferred next actions after proffering initial assessments. Absences
of forthcoming agreements are interpretable as instances of (as yet) un-
stated disagreements. Disagreements as well as other possible reactions
(such as no talk, disagreements weakened by partial agreements, requests
for clarification, challenging a presupposition or the competence of a co-
conversant) are less preferred than agreements, that is, they are dispre-
ferred (to various degrees). Nowadays preference survives primarily in
work on agreement and disagreement (Vuchinich 1990; Greatbatch 1992;
Kotthoff 1993; Gruber 1996; Hayashi 1996; Gruber 1998; Boyle 2000).
In CA, preference is discussed largely in terms of responses to actions,
but, according to the original concept established by Sacks (1995a;b;
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in particular Sacks 1995b, 367–9 and 444–52), the scope of preference
is very much greater. It is concerned as much with initial actions as
with responses, because preference is a feature of the constitution of all
actions.1
In addition, preference operates not only within adjacency pairs but
also across entire alternative sequences ranking sets of sequence types, due
to the possibility of the choice among various realizations of a sequence
type and also among alternative sequence types (Schegloff et al. 1977;
Schegloff 1979; Levinson 1983).2
Sacks regarded preference as a technical concept. Others (Atkinson
–Heritage 1984; Bilmes 1988; 1991; Kotthoff 1993) emphasized also the
original idea at later times, because the structural character of the notion
has lost its importance in comparison with a psychological interpretation
and a statistical approach to it as well. The differences in explicating
the phenomenon of preference have given rise to some confusion that
has resulted in establishing conflicting views on this matter, which I will
discuss in sections 2.2–2.5 below.
2.2. A structural approach to preference
Sacks did not define preference exactly in his writings and lectures either
(which enabled researchers to extend the meaning of the term later), he
demonstrated what he has meant by preference by means of examples. In
a lecture in April, 1971 (1995b, 367–9), Sacks said that there are preferred
ways of formulating invitations: if one is inviting somebody for an evening
during which dinner will be served, then that sort of information should
be clearly included in the invitation or the invitee will have reason to
assume that dinner will not be served. On the other hand, if the invitation
is for an evening in which conversation will occur, this piece of information
need not be included in the invitation. “Dinner” is a “first-preference
invitation”: if the formulation you select is not a first preference, then
you are indicating that a first preference is not present. It is obvious
that Sacks is not talking about preference in a psychological sense; he
is not concerned with what any or all of the participants would prefer
to do or say.
1 For examples, see section 2.2 below and Boyle (2000, 599).
2 For more details, see section 2.3.
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Bilmes (1988, 163) called attention to the invalidity of complemen-
tary inferences: if one displays one’s work, a painting, an essay, or what-
ever, there is a preference for expressions of approbation from the person
to whom the work is shown. That is, if no praise is forthcoming, it is
relevantly absent, leading usually to the inference that the work has been
judged unworthy of praise. The fact that the work is not explicitly dis-
praised, on the other hand, does not lead to the complementary inference
that the work has been judged too good to be dispraised.
Bilmes (ibid.) highlighted two aspects of Sacks’s notion of preference.
One is the principle of ordering: (in the appropriate situation) do (or
say) X, unless you have reason not to. This principle can be extended to
include any number of ordered options: do X, unless you have reason not
to, in which case do Y, unless you have reason not to, in which case do
Z, and so forth. The other aspect manifests itself in the recognition that
the existence of such rules of order is a basis for members’ inferences. It
is when the rules of order are used by members to make such inferences
that we can speak of preference in the technical sense.
Bilmes (op.cit., 163–5) distinguished two types of preference, estab-
lishing a type U (unusual, unexpected) preference and a type R (relevant
absence) preference.
Type U preference is based on a rule of the following form: if A
is speaking to B on some subject, and A knows something unusual or
unexpected about the subject which might be of significance to B, then
A should mention it to B. Our inference is based on the assumption that
the speaker follows the rule: if nothing unusual is mentioned, then we may
conclude that the speaker knows of nothing unusual that might warrant
mention.3 If the preferred alternative is not mentioned, it is not present.
The operative notion of type R preference is relevant absence. As
mentioned in section 2.1 above, certain contexts make relevant some pre-
ferred action. When that action is not taken, it is relevantly absent. Its
absence is noticeable and a basis for inference.4 (Type U preference is
3 Bilmes (op.cit., 164) illustrates this point with the following example: if we are
invited to a party, we do not go wearing a costume unless we are specifically
advised that it is a costume party, and it is ordinarily the responsibility of the one
issuing the invitation to volunteer such information on his or her own initiative.
When we arrive in ordinary dress and discover that it is a costume party, this
may be the basis for recriminations and apologies.
4 Dinner was not mentioned in the invitation because no dinner will be served.
Our work was not praised because it was not felt to be worthy of praise by our
audience.
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also, in a way, a matter of relevant absence, that is, the absence of a
preferred item is meaningful, but not necessarily noticeable.)5
The rule generalized by Bilmes (op.cit., 165) is formulated as follows:
preference operates with three (or more) alternatives: a preferred (X), a
nonpreferred (Y),6 and no mention of X or Y (N).7 The principle is that, if
X is preferred, N implies Y; conversely, if N implies Y, then X is preferred.
This rule has been extended primarily in the terms of type R preference
over analysing adjacency pairs and alternative sequences as well.
2.3. A (social) psychological dimension of preference
According to Bilmes (1988), the loss of the purely formal character of
preference is due, in part, to confusion between preference in its everyday
usage and preference as a technical notion. The standard psychological
sense of preference has a precedent in a lecture by Sacks (1987), first
presented in l973.8
Following Sacks, Pomerantz (1984) added to the original criterion
of preference (that is, relevant absence) the notion of markedness. Hav-
ing observed that dispreferred responses are routinely associated with
features that delay the production of the relevant response, for example,
gaps, hesitations, qualifiers, weak agreements,9 side sequences, and so on,
Pomerantz assumed that these features, called dispreference markers, cor-
relate to dispreferred responses. Thereafter, it has been suggested in the
CA literature that some features of turn/sequence organization operate
with respect to the preference/dispreference status of actions: preferred
5 Bilmes (op.cit., 164–5) demonstrates interesting ways in which type U and type R
preferences may interact.
6 Y may include a set of nonpreferred actions.
7 Bilmes (ibid.) illustrates the rule regarding both types: with type U preference,
we can mention that something unexpected will occur, for example, that it will be
a costume party (X); we can mention that nothing unexpected will occur, for ex-
ample, that it will be an ordinary party, with no special dress (Y); or we may omit
any mention (N). Likewise, with type R preference, we can mention something
preferred, for example, that dinner will be served; we can mention something
nonpreferred, for example, that dinner will not be served; or mention neither.
8 The everyday usage is discussed in Atkinson – Drew (1979) and Owen (1983)
as well.
9 Weak agreements preface disagreements by agreeing with the prior speaker’s po-
sition.
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responses are direct, often abbreviated, structurally simple, and typically
immediate, dispreferred ones are typically indirect, structurally elabo-
rated, and delayed. In explaining the phenomenon, Pomerantz (1984, 77)
refers to sociability, support, and solidarity, that is, to psychological mo-
tivation.
Bilmes (1988, 173–4; 1991, 464–6) suggested that, although dispref-
erence markers are associated with preference, they are part of a different,
partly independent, phenomenon. Delays are, in fact, expressive of the
speaker’s reluctance to produce the response which should follow, conse-
quently Bilmes refers to them as reluctance markers. He pointed out that
reluctance markers do not necessarily accompany dispreferred utterances
and may equally occur with preferred alternatives.
Accounts occurring very frequently in dispreferred actions are care-
fully formulated explanations for disagreements and refusals (Levinson
1983, 334). Considering that preferred actions do not include accounts,
in the occurrence or absence of accounts we could at first sight expect
a criterion of preference in a psychological sense. Bilmes (1991, 466)
pointed out that it is inappropriate to correlate accounts with prefer-
ence, because accounts regularly occur with disagreements and refusals,
whether or not they are preferred.10
According to Taylor and Cameron (1987, 113–4), there is an ob-
vious functional connection between some dispreferred second parts to
adjacency pairs and the formal features of delay, mitigation, apology,
etc., with which they are characteristically produced; namely, that their
speakers would prefer (in the ordinary sense of the term) not to have been
put in the position where they have to decline to produce the second pair
part, which the first speakers obviously would have preferred (again, in
its ordinary sense) to hear. Taylor and Cameron are of the opinion that
it is inappropriate to attempt to maintain the early ethnomethodological
claim that the differences between preferred and dispreferred actions are
purely formal, with no basis in the truly psychological sense of prefer-
ence: to say that one of two alternative acts is preferred to another is
not to imply anything about the relevant speakers’ own wishes, desires
or motives. Others, Levinson (1983), Owen (1983), and Heritage (1984)
among them, have acknowledged the psychological function of preference
organization, too, by tying it to the notion of interactional “face work”
established by Goffman (1955).
10 For further details regarding preferred disagreements, see section 3.
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Toolan (1989) agrees with Taylor and Cameron (1987) to the ex-
tent that they emphasize the psychological and evaluative dimension of
preference. At the same time, he criticizes them for attributing the psy-
chological preferences to individual speakers. Toolan (op.cit., 264) argues
that the psychological “tenor” carried by the preference organization is a
collective normative protocol and may have little to do with the partic-
ular preferences of particular speakers in specific contexts. Interactants
know that the collective social preference for example for invitations is to
be met with acceptance, but that the collective preference pattern may
not reflect the preferences of specific interactants. Preference organiza-
tion is rooted in the norms and psychological preferences of the society
and not the individual, as Toolan suggests (ibid.).
Concerning preference, Jacobs and Jackson (Jacobs–Jackson 1982;
Jacobs 1987), emphasize the importance of such psychological notions as
conventional desires or intentions accompanying speech acts11 (a request
is conventionally recognized to express a desire that the other will com-
ply to; the conventional desire expressed by an invitation is to accept it).
Thus, a preferred response is one that fulfills the conventional desire or
intention of the speech act, whether or not that conventional desire coin-
cides with the speaker’s actual desire. It is obvious that the conventions
constituting speech acts have their roots in the norms of society.
The psychological interpretation of preference is striking also in es-
says which discuss the manifestation of preference in ranking alternative
sequences. In their research on the organization of repair, Schegloff et al.
(1977) revealed the following set of preferences (from the most preferred
to the least preferred): preference 1 is for self-initiated self-repair in own
turn (or in the transition space); preference 2 is for other-initiated self-
repair in the third turn; preference 3 is for other-initiated other-repair
in the fourth turn; and, finally, preference 4 is for other-initiated other-
repair in the second turn, without inviting self-repair. Thus, the handling
of repair coincides with the choice among alternative sequences.
Jefferson (1983) suggested that preference 4 above should be ranked
higher (as preference 2) in the hierarchy if a speaker’s error is replaced by
the addressee within an utterance which includes important information
besides repair. Jefferson accounts for the high ranking of this solution
(called embedded correction) by pointing out that it avoids the risk of
overtly challenging the speaker’s competence.
11 Investigating verbal interaction, Jacobs and Jackson unify the concepts and meth-
ods of CA and speech act theory.
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Investigating the initial turns of telephone calls, Schegloff (1979) set
up a hierarchy of preferences in a similar way. He found that for telephone
recognitions between known parties the preference is for both caller and
recipient to provide the minimal cues (at best only greetings) they judge
sufficient for the other to recognize the speaker. Overt self-identification
is dispreferred because it challenges the familiarity of friendship.
Reviewing the CA literature in connection with requests, Levinson
(1983, 360–1) suggests that after a pre-request there may be a preference
for the avoidance of requests altogether. He sets up the following prefer-
ence ranking operating over three kinds of sequences: most preferred is
a pre-request – response to a non-overt request sequence; next preferred
is a pre-request – offer – acceptance of an offer sequence; finally, the least
preferred alternative is a pre-request – go ahead – request – compliance/
refusal sequence.
To invite an offer seems to be preferred to a request sequence because
explicit requests risk refusal (Schegloff 1979, 49), which is a face threat-
ening act (FTA). A motivation for applying pre-requests is avoiding an
action (the request) that could obtain a dispreferred response (a rejection)
and hence the checking of the most likely grounds for refusal (Levinson
1983, 356–64). In addition, requests threaten the addressee’s negative
face wants intrinsically by indicating (potentially) that the speaker does
not intend to avoid impeding the addressee’s freedom of action, as Brown
and Levinson (1987, 65) point out.
To summarize the approaches mentioned before, Schegloff (1979),
Jefferson (1983) and Levinson (1983) attribute the preference ranking
operating over alternative sequences and sequence types to social psycho-
logical motivation: by choosing a preferred alternative, the speaker can
avoid an action threatening his/her own face or the face of the addressee.
With reference to Heritage (1984, 268), Brown and Levinson (1987,
38–40) argue that face considerations seem to determine which kinds
of responses are preferred vs. dispreferred. In their eyes, agreement is
preferred because disagreement is an FTA; self-repair is preferred because
correction by other may imply that self is incompetent; acceptances of
offers or requests are preferred because the alternative refusals would
imply lack of consideration; and so on. Similarly, they take many kinds
of pre-sequences to be motivated by face considerations.
Acta Linguistica Hungarica 52,
preference and hungarian conflict sequences 49
2.4. A statistical approach to preference
Several conversation analysts — Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (1977),
Sacks and Schegloff (1979), Levinson (1983), among others — tried to
account for preference organization relying on frequency distribution. Ar-
guing that people do what they prefer to do, and, so, if people overwhelm-
ingly do a certain thing, this indicates a massive preference, they arrived
at the conclusion that more frequently occurring alternatives must have a
preferred status. Resisting the temptation to regard frequency of occur-
rence as a criterion of preference, most authors have used a more careful
phrasing claiming that frequency distribution is evidence of preference or-
ganization. Schegloff et al. (1977, 362) found the fact that self-correction
is “vastly more common than other-correction” to be “gross, prima facie
evidence” of the preference for self-correction.
Bilmes (1988, 192) disapproved of the statistical approach to prefer-
ence for two reasons. On the one hand, he criticized it because of the in-
fluence of the psychological sense of preference. On the other, he pointed
out that the authors mentioned above have turned from the concept of
preference to emphasizing ordering;12 that is, they were trying to account
for what people do rather than for the inferences that people draw. Bilmes
emphasized that preference governs interpretation, not production. How-
ever, if, contrary to him, we accept the social psychological motivation
of preference, we can suppose with good reason that production corre-
sponds to the expectations evoked by the preference/dispreference status
of actions, because people follow the norms of society whenever possible.
2.5. A complex interpretation of preference
The latest interpretation of preference has been provided by Boyle (2000),
after the publication of Sacks’s lectures and building on them. Boyle
gives an interpretation of preference that both accommodates the varied
interpretations and provides a clear and simple account of the notion. He
emphasizes that the clear and all-encompassing criterion of preference,
in a Sacksian approach, is noticeable absence and accountability. At the
same time, unlike Bilmes (1988), he does not consider connecting the
12 Moreover, since a prescribed alternative may be unavailable, there is still a ques-
tion of whether frequency of occurrence is strong evidence even of a principle of
ordering (Bilmes 1988, 172).
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notion of preference with markedness, frequency distribution and face
work as a false interpretation of preference but regards them as valid
aspects of preference.
Boyle (2000, 586–7) accepts as valid the correlation of preference
with markedness and frequency distribution to a limited degree (i.e., in
the case of some sequences) and attributes the generalization of such
correlations to the widely known work of Levinson (1983). Comparing
views on the relationship of preference and face work, Boyle (2000, 588)
points out, following Czyzewski (1989), that regarding preference as a
consequence of social solidarity raises the question why actions are con-
stituted as preferred or dispreferred. True to its ethnomethodological
origins, however, CA is interested in finding out how speakers produce
and understand preferred or dispreferred actions.13
According to Czyzewski (1989, 52–3), preferred actions contribute
to the maintenance of social solidarity directly, while dispreferred actions
do so indirectly; that is, the “social solidarity” argument is important,
but it is not an adequate account of the phenomenon of preference. Nev-
ertheless, Boyle states that in order to fully understand the concept of
preference it is necessary to ally the issue of why individuals act as they
do to the question of how they construct preferred and dispreferred turns.
Boyle considers social solidarity strengthening face work, marked-
ness, and frequency distribution as such aspects of preference which do
not constitute criteria of preference. Referring to Sacks’s analyses along
these lines, he argues that the criteria of preference, as demonstrated
by Bilmes (1988) already, are noticeable absence and its (normative)
accountability. The occurrence of a dispreferred action, that is, the non-
occurrence of a preferred, conditionally relevant action, calls for explana-
tion. Here, Boyle (2000, 590) is the first to make a distinction between
two types of dispreferred actions. One of them invokes no negative con-
sequence or sanction. In this case, from an individual’s failure to offer a
greeting, for example, one might infer that the other person is deep in
thought or does not recognize one, etc. These are acceptable accounts
from which no sanctions should follow. In the other case, in a quite con-
trary fashion, the noticeable absence of an expected action gives rise to
negative inferences and to sanctions: when another person fails to offer
a greeting, one might account for the absence of the greeting by deciding
that the action was deliberate and make negative inferences about the
other person’s character and behaviour.
13 Bilmes (1988) called attention to this distinction as well.
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This distinction was not recognized before, and only the deliberate
and sanctionable type of dispreferred actions was discussed in the lit-
erature. According to Boyle, this tendency might be a consequence of
the implicit overgeneralization of the principle “trying to avoid the dis-
preferred action”, at work in speakers’ competence and recognized by
Levinson (1983, 333). From this it follows that if one does not try to
avoid a dispreferred action, this will be considered deliberate. However,
it is clearly impossible, and not necessarily desirable, to avoid actions
that are merely noticeable and accountable but not sanctionable.
The question that arises is that, if there is no explicit explanation,
how does the co-conversant choose between the two possible accounts
of the dispreferred action? Boyle answers this question only indirectly:
the choice between the accounts is greatly influenced (even in the case
of an explicit explanation) by the indexical knowledge of the situation
and the co-conversant, the importance of which factors is stressed by
Boyle (2000, 594–7) when, following Sacks, he points out how greatly
these influence the speaker’s decision in what is a preferred and what is
a dispreferred answer to the question “How are you?” (from the point
of view of the person asking it).14
Taking into account indexical knowledge does not question the sig-
nificant role of normative accountability in interpersonal understanding
but calls attention to the dangers of applying the norms automatically.
2.6. Conclusion
Considering the above, we can agree with Boyle that a complex inter-
pretation of the concept of preference is necessary. But all approaches
are equally important, none can be left out at the expense of the others,
since they all grasp the essence of preference on different levels. Boyle
fails to clarify this; he accepts the validity of the various interpretations,
but, regarding the structural aspect most significant, he considers the
others secondary.
Preference as a structural notion provides the descriptive inference
rule of the mechanism of interpretation. The psychological approach
stresses the reason of the preferred/dispreferred nature of actions. Pref-
14 Throughout Sacks’s discussion in ‘Everyone has to lie’ (1995a, 549–66) one is
reminded of how close the everyday meaning of preference comes to the technical
meaning of the concept.
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erence, from this aspect, is the expression of the social norm. This norm
is described in the literature as interpersonality principles — principles
which regulate interpersonal relations in communication and the self-
projection of the communicative partners (Németh T. 2003; 2004). Such
principles are the politeness principle (Leech 1983; minimize the expres-
sion of impolite beliefs, and maximize the expression of polite beliefs, all
other things being equal); the principle of face saving (Goffman 1959; save
your own and your partner’s face in communication); politeness strate-
gies (Brown–Levinson 1987; strategies creating and maintaining negative
and positive face, where negative face is people’s desire that other people
do not prevent them in their actions, while positive face is people’s de-
sire that their wishes, aims, attitudes etc. would be desirable for others
as well). Finally, the statistical definition of preference is an empirical
generalization.
In order to fully understand the concept of preference it is necessary
but, as we will see in section 3, not sufficient to take into account the
inference rule and the interpersonality principles.
3. Preference in verbal conflict
3.1. The notion of verbal conflict
Verbal conflict is a specific speech activity (Gumperz 1982, 166) or activ-
ity type (Levinson 1992) the recognition and differentiation of which is
part of the pragmatic competence of all the participants and the analyst.
In verbal conflict the participants take turns attacking each other’s ut-
terances, actions or selves. The misunderstanding can conclude with one
party’s victory (and the other party’s defeat), the voluntary acceptance
of the opponent’s position, a compromise, a stand-off, a withdrawal, or
the intervention of a dominant third party. Verbal conflicts often remain
unconcluded: in such cases the participants give up the opposition and
start another (speech) activity (Vuchinich 1990).
All speech activities where these characteristics can be identified
(naturally, only one of the possible conclusion types can occur in each
situation) belong to the category of verbal conflicts, which range from
a single episode to a confrontation encompassing an entire conversation.
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The critical discussion is a more strictly ordered type of verbal confronta-
tion (see Eemeren–Grootendorst 1992, Eemeren et al. 1996).15
Conflict episodes are entities which comprise more than two turns
and display structural properties which constrain the functions and in-
terpretations of verbal contributions occurring in their course (Gruber
1998, 476) (see section 3.2). One piece of discourse can contain more
than one conflict episode.
The manifestation of preference organization in verbal conflicts is
important and even necessary to investigate, on the one hand, because in
this speech activity preference structure of the statement—agreement/
disagreement sequence changes (see section 3.2), and this makes it neces-
sary to interpret the concept of preference in such a way that it would be
adequate for this context as well. On the other hand, arriving at a care-
fully argued conclusion on the issue of the correlation of preference and
markedness requires an investigation of the manifestations of markedness
in verbal conflicts. I attempt to do so in section 3.4 below.
3.2. The preferred status of disagreement
One of the long standing theses of CA is the preference of agreement
over disagreement. This thesis is the generalization of the statement
made by Pomerantz (1984) in an analysis of an adjacency pair consisting
of an assessment and a response. The fact that this finding became con-
sidered generally valid for conversation is most likely due to the social
psychological interpretation of preference. At the same time, Pomerantz
(op.cit., 77–94) demonstrates that disagreement is preferred in response
to self-deprecation: if it is lacking, dispreferred agreement is inferred.
Elsewhere, Pomerantz (1978) states that agreement (especially in its un-
mitigated form) is dispreferred as a response to praise.16
There are clearly situations where disagreement is preferred. Accu-
sations also operate contrary to the preference for agreement. With ref-
15 The main parts of the critical discussion are the following: confrontation, debate
opening, argumentation, and concluding decision. All of these can be character-
ized through the basic or complex speech acts typically realized in them, and,
in addition to this, the argumentation part can also be described through the
relevant argument schemata (Eemeren – Grootendorst 1992).
16 Expressing or not expressing agreement and disagreement seems to be culturally
specific (Clarke – Argyle 1982). The behaviour forms suggested by Pomerantz are
valid only in European cultures and cultures similar to them.
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erence to Atkinson–Drew (1979) and Heritage (1984), Garcia (1991, 821)
called attention to the fact that after accusations preference for agree-
ment would lead to an admission of guilt as the preferred response to an
accusation; for accusations, however, denials are the preferred response
because the absence or delay of a denial may be interpreted as an admis-
sion of/evidence of guilt.17 Furthermore, Garcia (op.cit., 828) pointed out
that denials in ordinary conversation tend to be placed immediately after
the accusation, without delay, accounts, or other mitigating techniques.
Accusations therefore make disagreement relevant and thus provide an
interactional environment for escalation into disputes and arguments.
Bilmes (1988) investigated the preference status of the second part
of adjacency pairs in the first part of which A attributes some action,
thought, or attitude to B in B’s presence: here, following the inference
rule, there is a preference for B to contradict A.
The nucleus of the verbal conflict, which can become the starting
point for a single episode or a longer critical discussion, is a three-step
introductory sequence (Gruber 1998, 477; Muntigl–Turnbull 1998, 227;
Gruber 2001, 1822):
1. A: statement
2. B: counterstatement (i.e., disagreement with A)
3. A: counterstatement to B (i.e., disagreement with B and possibly insisting on 1)
Gruber (1998) argues that the occurrence of the third move by A is cru-
cial for establishing a conflict episode, because if A reacts with any other
action than a counterstatement to B (e.g., giving up his/her position,
apologizing, or just being silent) in step 3, no conflict develops from the
disagreement sequence (i.e., steps 1 and 2). The counterstatement pro-
duced in step 2 opens up the possibility of moving on to argumentation,
17 According to Dersley–Wootton (2000, 387–8), Garcia’s claim is overly general.
Analysing sequences immediately following complaints and accusations, they dif-
ferentiate between two types of denials, “didn’t do” denials and “not at fault”
denials. Denials of the “didn’t do” type are characterized by features of preferred
actions both in their form and their interpretation: the typical manifestation of
this type of denial is not delayed, it is short and direct, and its lack (or delay)
implies the admission of guilt. Denials of the “not at fault” type, which are often
delayed, typically have two components: the complainee implicitly acknowledges
some element of truth in the original complaint, but he or she overwhelmingly
rejects any culpability for the action in question. The delay of a “not at fault”
denial does not create a basis for participants to infer that the complainee accepts
blame or guilt for the complained-of action.
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but it is only at step 3 that it will become clear whether the conversation
can continue in a new context of developing the conflict or not.
Disagreement is preferred in the speech activity type of verbal con-
flicts—both in longer, argumentative discourse and in shorter sequences
of verbal conflict (Bilmes 1991; Kotthoff 1993; Gruber 1996; 1998). Ac-
cording to the rule of preference, if a statement is not followed by dis-
agreement, the inference that is made is that the statement is agreed with
(or at least accepted). If, however, open agreement is not expressed, no
inference of disagreement is made.
One of the findings of the investigation of verbal conflicts is the
realization that preference structure is sensitive to context: unspecific
friendly conversations are performed with an orientation toward consen-
sus and agreement is preferred. However, as soon as a counterstatement
occurs following disagreement during a conversation, the context speci-
fications change: they become conflict-oriented, which, in turn, triggers
a change in the preference structure. The participants orient each other
to the expectation of disagreement, and disagreement will be the pre-
ferred interpretation (Bilmes 1991, 465–6; Kotthoff 1993, 194–5; Gruber
1998, 471–6). In the case of institutional debate, the context is conflict-
oriented from the start.
3.3. The data
The corpus of data consists of audio cassette recorded and transcribed
conversations from one radio and two television series of debate programs.
All conversations occurred in spontaneously occurring argumentative dis-
course in live broadcasts. The corpus contains a total of 644 turns or
17,582 words.
Discourse produced in the media has been widely investigated (Her-
itage 1985; Hutchby 1992; Liddicoat et al. 1994; Gruber 1996; Hutchby
1996; Gruber 1998; Bilmes 1999; Gruber 2001; Lerch 2002), sometimes
with this specific goal in mind, at other times in order to avoid the dif-
ficulties of collecting conversation data containing naturally occurring
conflicts.
I investigated 10 dialogues, containing a total of 401 turns or 9,724
words, from the Hungarian call-in radio program Beszéljük meg! ‘Let’s
discuss it’ (by György Bolgár).18 (Below, the dialogues are referred to
18 The length of each conversation is given in the Appendix.
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with the abbreviation LDI for the name of the program and the number of
the dialogue.) According to the script of this program, at the beginning
of each program the host introduces 3 or 4 topical issues of public interest,
and then he takes telephone calls from the listeners. Callers are invited
to reflect on one or more of the given topics but can introduce new topics
only with the approval of the host. The aim of the conversation, according
to the script of the program, is for the caller to fully explicate his/her
position. In order to aid this, the host usually takes a point of view
opposite with the caller and argues for it—thus, in most cases, a verbal
confrontation develops between them, although it very rarely becomes
confrontational (see LDI 7). Several politeness strategies occur in the
conversations (Lerch 2002). The participation of the two participants
in the conversation is more or less balanced. All ten dialogues follow a
similar structure: it contains a loose flow of arguments for and against
possible positions on one main topic (or one main topic and a side topic, in
the case of two conversations, LDI 6 and 10), framed with and interrupted
by sequences and episodes not containing verbal conflict.
In Aktuális ‘Topical’ (referred to with the abbreviation TOP below),
a television debate program, the presenter carries on a longer conversa-
tion in the studio with one public personality (or sometimes two) about
the leading news story of the day and other topical issues. The aim in this
program is also that the guests expound on their positions and defend
them. I used a stretch of discourse of 122 turns, or 3,475 words, from
this program in my investigation. The participants use equal amounts
of time in this program as well, and the extent of the confrontation de-
pends on the topic (and the identity of the guest). In the stretch of
discourse used for the present investigation a confrontational dispute de-
veloped: its structure is more pointed than those of the radio programs,
and touches on three topics, from which three episodes containing verbal
conflict develop.
In the television program Pro és kontra ‘Pros and cons’ (referred to
with P&C below), according to the script, a moderator leads a dispute
between two parties representing two opposing positions on an issue. In
the stretch of discourse used for this investigation (of 121 turns, or 4,383
words), however, the confrontation is so sharp that the moderator almost
has no chance to interrupt the conversation, and, thus, the participants
of the dispute carry on a dialogue most of the time. This conversation
follows the normative rules of critical discussion.
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Besides allowing to investigate markedness in both milder and sharper
confrontations, the corpus also has the advantage of containing mostly
semi-institutional conversations (LDI 1–10). Semi-institutional discourse
is close to everyday conversation and is characterized by several of its
features (Ilie 2001). In the discourse from the two television programs I
analyse the institutional character is more dominant, but it is still not a
typical example of institutional debate, especially as far as the linguistic
manifestation of the confrontation is concerned. Thus, the observations
made on the basis of the corpus will not be alien to everyday linguistic
behaviour. The interpretation of preference would have to apply to the
type of discourse investigated in this paper in any case.
3.4. Markedness
The corpus contains the following means of delay, called dispreference
markers in the literature.
In turns realizing agreement, at the starts of turns speakers used
hesitation, turn introducing prefaces (e.g., hát ‘well’, nézze ‘look’, na most
‘well, now’), qualifiers (e.g., szerintem ‘in my opinion’, én úgy gondolom
‘what I think is that. . . ’), or a combination of these.
In turns realizing disagreement, turns also start with hesitation, pref-
aces, qualifiers, and also pauses, initiations of side sequences instead of
disagreement (in order to delay disagreement), turn introducing agree-
ment components, pro forma agreements, apologies, or a combination of
these.
Next, in section 3.4.1, I will bring examples to the use of each of these
markers. All the examples will be illustrated in turns realizing disagree-
ment, partly because all of the markers can occur in this utterance type
(while not all do in turns realizing agreement), and partly because, due
to the preferred status of disagreement in this context, their occurrence
is unexpected in these utterances (if we uphold the thesis of the existence
of a correlation between preference and markedness). Following the ex-
amples, I demonstrate in tables the distribution of unmarked and marked
realizations of agreement vs. disagreement in the corpus (section 3.4.2).
3.4.1. Markers in turns realizing disagreement
Abbreviations used in the identification of examples are as follows: letters
(and, in some cases, numbers) before colons identify the source of the dis-
course (see the Appendix), letters after the colon identify the speaker(s)
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(also see the Appendix), while the letter identifying the speaker is fol-
lowed by numbers which refer to the number of the first turn of the
example within the stretch of discourse. (For other transcription conven-
tions, see the Appendix.)
(i) Hesitation. Various forms of hesitation (including self-editing) have
been identified in the literature (Levinson 1983, 334) as markers of dis-
preference (I give such markers in boldface in the examples). Hesitation
signals the reluctance of the speaker to take a stand or his/her wish to
delay it, in the case of both agreement and disagreement.
(1) (TOP: GYT10)
(Topic: erecting a statue to János Kádár)
GYT: Én azt gondolom, nem olyan lehetetlen. Hát ütnünk kell persze a vasat,
és még nagyon sokat kell ebben az ügyben politizálni, de megmondom,
hogy (.) szóval (.) két szempontot lehet mérlegelni. Az egyik, hogy ki
volt Kádár János. Szóval azért Orbán Viktor is meg az ország minden
vezetője tudja, hogy a közvélemény-kutatások mit mutatnak. Azok pe-
dig azt mutatják, hogy Kádár Jánost a magyar nép úgy élte meg és úgy
emlékezik rá, mint a század legkiemelkedőbb egyéniségére.
JB: De hát így – ezt így nem tudom – ja hogy vannak olyan közvélemény-
kutatások, amelyek (.) ö (.) hogy ha azt kérik, ez nem is vélemény, hanem





JB: =ez nem kétséges, de – hát – először is. . .
GYT: What I think is that it’s not impossible. We have to strike the iron, yes,
and have to do a lot of politics on the issue, but I tell you that (.) well (.)
two aspects can be weighed. One is who János Kádár was. Well, Viktor
Orbán and all the leaders of the country know what public opinion polls
show. They show that János Kádár was experienced and is known to
the Hungarian people as one of the most outstanding personalities of the
century.
JB: But this way – I don’t know about that – oh, you mean that there are polls
that (.) er (.) that if you ask, this is not an opinion, that if you ask





JB: =no doubt, but – well – first of all. . .
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(ii) Prefaces. Whether they introduce agreement or disagreement, a pref-
ace signals that the participant does not find the previous position com-
pletely convincing.
(2) (TOP: JB100)
(Topic: the relationship of the Workers’ Party and the Hungarian Socialist Party,
HSP)
JB: A (.) kongresszuson mondott beszédében Elnök Úr (.) beszélt is erről
az MSZP és a Munkáspárt viszonyáról, hogy – ö – hogy (2.0) azt mondta,
hogy az MSZP ne akadályozza a Munkáspártot, és hogy ne tegyenek
olyan nyilatkozatokat, miszerint a Munkáspárt (2.0) ööö – a mai arcu-
latával nem alkalmas arra, hogy együttműködjön vele az MSZP. Tehát
tudja, hogy miről van szó többek között? Hát például hogy a (.) a
(.) az iraki Bath-párttal kötött együttműködési megállapodás az még
érvényben van? Hát ilyesmiről.
GYT: Nézze, nem erről van szó. Arról – arról – arról van szó, kilencvennyolcban
is ez történt és azóta is ez van, az MSZP az SZDSZ-szel akar együtt
menni.
JB: In (.) your speech at the congress, Mr. President, you spoke about
this, the relationship of the HSP and the Workers’ Party, that – er –
that (2.0) you said that the HSP shouldn’t hinder the Workers’ Party,
and they shouldn’t make announcements to the effect that the Workers’
Party (2.0) errr – with its current image is not suitable for the HSP to
cooperate with. You know what it’s all about? For instance, is the (.)
the (.) the cooperation agreement signed with the Iraqi Bath Party still
in effect? These kinds of things.
GYT: Look, that’s not it at all. What – what – what it’s all about is that this
is what happened in ninety-eight, and this is what has been happening
since, that the HSP wants to go with the AFD.19
(iii) Qualifiers. Qualifiers limit the validity of the position (of agreement
or disagreement) expressed in the turn to the speaker.
(3) (P&C: IKo15)
(Topic: dividing the media.)
IKo: Nem, azt gondolom, hogy ez piacgazdaság ma Magyarországon,
demokrácia van, piacgazdaság van, a tulajdon szentségét tiszteletben
tartja az állam, itt egy csomó magánlap jött létre, magánemberek pénzt
fektettek be egy bizonyos áruba, mert a – az újság is áru, ezt nem lehet
már befolyásolni. Befolyásolni lehet a közmédiát, ott viszont elég erőtel-
jes szerep várhat a mostani politikai szereplőkre, de szerintem egészen
más szerep, mint amit a Kerényi Imréék ezen és más demonstrációkon el-
19 AFD: Alliance of Free Democrats.
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mondtak, én azt gondolom, hogy egy tisztességes, kiegyensúlyozott köz-
szolgálati televíziót kell teremteni.
IKe: Nem hiszek benne, hogy ezt most meg lehet valósítani, szóval megbuk-
tunk ezzel, Ilona. Egy olyan idegen modellt akartunk honosítani, ami
ebben az országban nem honosítható. . .
IKo: No, I think that this is a market economy now in Hungary, we have
democracy and a market economy, the sanctity of private property is
respected by the state, a whole lot of private papers were established,
private people invested money in a certain commodity, because news-
papers are a commodity as well, this cannot be influenced any more.
You can influence public media, but there you can expect for the cur-
rent political personalities to have a pretty forceful role, but this role is,
I think, very different from what Imre Kerényi and others were talking
about in this and other demonstrations, and what I think is that a decent
balanced public television should be created.
IKe: I don’t believe in the possibility of carrying this out now, I think we failed
with this, Ilona. We wanted to import a foreign model which cannot be
imported into this country. . .
(iv) A turn introducing agreement component (weak agreement). It can
be face saving as well as carry an important propositional meaning.
(4) (LDI10: GYB23)
(Topic: introducing a toll on a highway)
GYB: Igen, de ebből mégiscsak az a logikai következtetés vonható le, hogy
aki használ valamit, aki bizonyos juttatásokhoz, örömhöz, nem tudom
micsodához jut azáltal, hogy kutyát tart, vagy azáltal, hogy autót tart
és autópályát használ, akkor az fizesse meg annak a költségét, nem?
Tehát ne a kutyatulajdonos fizesse meg az autótulajdonos=
C: =Ebben tökéletesen igaza van, Bolgár Úr, de végső soron azok az utak is
romlanak, amik nem az autópályához tartoznak, és ezt majd kinek kell
karbantartani, ha áttevődik a forgalom?
GYB: Yes, but from this you can logically conclude that whoever uses some-
thing, whoever receives some kind of benefits, joy, whatever, from keep-
ing a dog or from having a car and using a highway should pay for the
expenses, shouldn’t they? So, it shouldn’t be the dog owner who pays
for the car owner’s=
C: =You are perfectly right in this, Mr Bolgár, but those roads that are not
part of the highway system are damaged, too, and who will be maintain-
ing them if the traffic will move over to them?
(v) Pro forma agreement: the igen, de ‘yes, but’ strategy. It serves more
of a connecting function in a sharp conflict, whereas in milder disputes
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the literal meaning of the phrase (agreement and face saving) plays a
more important role in the interpretation.
(5) (LDI9: GYB9)
(Topic: whether the NATO ground forces will deploy in Kosovo)
GYB: Szóval hogy kiürüljön a terület, hogy aztán szabadon mozoghassanak a
csapatok.
C: Pontosan, és pontosan ott, ahol a háborút lényegében a szerbek részéről
is – az az egyik állásfoglalás az ő részükről, hogy olyan helyen legyen a
háború, ha már elkerülhetetlen, ahol lényegében nem szerb lakosság van.
GYB: Igen, de mért lett volna érdeke ez a NATO-nak, hogy kiürüljön Koszovó,
neki az lett volna feltételezésem szerint az érdeke, hogy bombázza a főbb
célpontokat három napon keresztül, és Milosevics föltartja a kezét, azt
mondja, hogy jó, egyezzünk meg így, ahogy akarjátok.
GYB: Well, so that the area is cleared of people and the troops could move
around freely.
C: Exactly, and exactly where, from the point of view of the Serbs, the war
is – that’s their standpoint, that the war, if it’s unavoidable, should be
happening where the population is largely not Serbian.
GYB: GYB: Yes, but why would it have been in NATO’s interest for Kosovo to
be cleared of people, their interest would have been, I suppose, to bomb
the major targets for three days, so Milosevic puts up his hands and says
all right, let’s come to an agreement the way you want to.
(vi) Apology (questioning one’s competence). It can introduce agreement,
too, even though I do not have an example of this in my corpus.
(6) (LDI6: GYB21)
(Topic: the war in Kosovo, and the peace process)
GYB: Talán a kormány abból indul ki, hogy mi csak egy tag vagyunk a ti-
zenkilenc közül, ráadásul nagyon frissen fölvett, és bár valóban a mi
érdekeink nagyon sokban különböznek a többi NATO-tagállamétól, de
azért illúzió volna azt hinni, hogy egy magyar javaslatra reagálva majd a
NATO vezető hatalmai, elsősorban az Egyesült Államok megváltoztatják
a politikájukat, nem?
C: Megmondom őszintén, hogy én nagyon keveset értek a politikához, a ka-
tonáskodáshoz pedig végképp semmit, de úgy gondolom, hogy ebben a
helyzetben minden eszközt meg kell ragadni arra, hogy Magyarországot
valahogy kitereljük ebből a válságból. Nem afelé kell itt a dolgoknak
haladni, hogy itt teljes jogú NATO-tagként, én nem tudom megérteni,
hogy mért nem lehetett ezt megvétózni. . .
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GYB: Maybe the government thinks that we are only one of the nineteen mem-
bers, and a very new member at that, and even though our interests are
really very different from those of the other NATO member states, it
would be an illusion to think that in reaction to a suggestion from Hun-
gary the leading nations of NATO, especially the United States, will
change their policy, wouldn’t it?
C: I’ll tell you frankly, I know very little about politics and even less about
army matters, but I think that in this situation all means should be
used to stir Hungary out of this crisis. Things shouldn’t be going in the
direction where as a NATO member of full rights, I can’t understand
why it wasn’t possible to veto this. . .
(vii) Pause and side sequence. I discuss these two markers together be-
cause in my corpus significant pauses affecting interpretation occur only
before initiations of side sequences. The following example, thus, illus-
trates multiple marking (see section 3.4.2).
(7) (LDI3: H22)
(Topic: intelligence scandal)
C: Na most – öö – hát – öö – ezek után tulajdonképpen mondjuk – öö –
elképzelhetőnek tartom, hogy – ööö – a hírszerzés jól dolgozott, nem?
(3.0)
GYB: Hát – nem értem az összefüggést.
C: Öö – mert tulajdonképpen ezerkilencszázötvenhat(.)ban tulajdonképpen
Horn Gyula – a-a-a – ((coughs))
GYB: Karhatalmista volt.
C: Karhatalmi
GYB: Na de ezt nem kell titkosszolgálati módszerekkel vagy – nem (.) olyan
módszerekkel, de egy titkosszolgálati szervezetnek földerítenie, mert hát
(.) ő is elismerte.
C: Well, now – er – well – errr – after all this I can actually say – er – that I
would consider it possible that – er – the intelligence did their job right,
don’t you think?
(3.0)
GYB: Well – I don’t understand the connection.
C: Er – because actually in (.) nineteen fifty-six Gyula Horn actually – er
((coughs))
GYB: was a member of the special police squad.
C: Police squad
GYB: But this doesn’t have to be uncovered with the means of the intelli-
gence or – not with their special means, but an intelligence organization,
because well (.) he admitted this, too.
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The pause and the side sequence initiated in the second turn signal the
possibility of disagreement and, at the same time, delay its realization
until the sixth turn. But the possibility of the realization of agreement
is open until this sixth turn as well.
Having demonstrated that both preferred disagreement and dispre-
ferred agreement can be introduced by so-called dispreference markers,
in the following subsection I will discuss what the distribution is between
unmarked and marked realizations of the two utterance types.
3.4.2. Markedness and statistics
In studying the realization of agreement and disagreement, I also took
into consideration two other factors besides markedness: one is differen-
tiating between the main topic vs. the side topic, and the other is the
degree of the intensity of the conflict.
Both factors have been discussed in the literature, the former in con-
nection with the study of agreement. Kotthoff (1993, 210) differentiates
between partial agreement and agreement regarding the main topic of
the conflict. Partial agreement concerns an unimportant aspect of the
conflict or a side topic and closes the argument only as far as that is
concerned, leaving the basic opposition unsolved. Agreement concerning
an important aspect of the main topic brings the argument to an end,
whereby the side topics lose their significance. This is rather face threat-
ening because, if there is no compromise involved, it means that one of the
parties was not able to defend his/her position. Such kind of agreement
occurs in everyday conversations fairly rarely (Vuchinich 1990).
Kotthoff (ibid.) points out another distinction as well which can be
important in investigating verbal conflicts: namely, the distinction be-
tween aggravated vs. mitigated disputes. The characteristics of aggra-
vated disputes are as follows: a decrease of use or complete lack of de-
laying elements (the markers discussed above) and an increase of use of
interruptions. Mitigated disputes are characterized by opposite tenden-
cies. My corpus is balanced in this respect: about half of it contains
sharp conflicts (LDI7, TOP and P&C; a total of 296 turns, or 8,818
words), while the other half (the rest of the LDI recordings; a total of
348 turns, or 8,764 words) contains mild conflicts.
The following table demonstrates the distribution of various realiza-
tions of agreement in the corpus as far as the above-mentioned aspects
are concerned. (S: sharp conflict (aggravated dispute); M: mild conflict
(mitigated dispute).)
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Table 1
Distribution of the realizations of agreement
main topic side topic
agreement S M S M
With no marker 1 (3%) 9 (26%) 9 (26%) 5 (14%)
With hesitation 1 (3%)
With preface 2 (6%)
With qualifier 1 (3%)
With multiple marking 4 (12%) 2 (6%)
The corpus contains altogether 34 turns that realize agreement. In con-
flict-oriented discourse, as we have seen in section 3.2 above, agreement is
a dispreferred response. Thus, if the markers were really markers of dis-
preference, marked cases should be in the majority. The data of the cor-
pus, however, show an opposite tendency: agreement is realized without
markers in 24 cases and with one or more markers in 10 cases. A tendency
of unmarkedness predominates in aggravated disputes (10 unmarked and
3 marked), in mitigated disputes (14 unmarked and 7 marked), in agree-
ment regarding the main topic (10 unmarked and 5 marked), as well as
in agreement regarding the side topic (14 unmarked and 5 marked).
A tendency to avoid agreement regarding the main topic of the con-
flict is supported by the data for aggravated dispute but not for mitigated
dispute.
The following table (Table 2) shows the distribution of the realiza-
tions of disagreement.
The corpus contains altogether 203 turns that realize disagreement.
Of these, 71 are realized without markers, 132 with them. This also
contradicts expectations in connection with preference status, since dis-
agreement is preferred, and, thus, most of the cases should be unmarked.
A tendency towards markedness is manifested in aggravated dispute
(41 unmarked and 58 marked), mitigated dispute (30 unmarked and 74
marked), disagreement regarding the main topic (62 unmarked and 114
marked), and disagreement regarding the side topic (9 unmarked and 18
marked). This is the exact opposite of what we have seen in connection
with agreement above.
Due to the limited size of the corpus it uses, this investigation aims
to form (and support) hypotheses rather than test them. The results,
as far as markedness is concerned, are that in conflict-oriented contexts
marking works similarly to consensus-oriented contexts, i.e., agreement
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Table 2
Distribution of the realizations of disagreement
main topic side topic
disagreement S M S M
With no marker 41 (20.2%) 21 (10.3%) 9 (4.5%)
With hesitation 2 (1%)
With preface 10 (5%) 5 (2.5%) 2 (1%) 2 (1%)
With qualifier 4 (2%) 3 (1.5%) 1 (0.5%)
With turn introducing
agreement component 10 (5%) 20 (10%) 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.5%)
With pro forma agreement 4 (2%) 12 (6%) 2 (1%) 1 (0.5%)
With apology 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.5%)
With insertion of
side sequence 9 (4.5%) 8 (4%) 1 (0.5%) 3 (1.5%)
With multiple marking 11 (5.4%) 16 (8%) 1 (0.5%) 1 (0.5%)
tends to be unmarked, while disagreement is more likely marked. The
rule of interpretation of preference, as we have seen, does not allow the
supposition that agreement is preferred in verbal conflicts. Markers, then,
as Bilmes (1988) also believed, do not mark dispreference in the structural
sense: their occurrence is motivated by some other factor.
3.5. An attempt to explain
In this section I will attempt to answer the question of what motivation
lies behind the preference of disagreement in verbal conflicts.
According to Kotthoff (1993, 209), in a fully developed dispute, con-
cession (i.e., the acceptance, without reservations, of the opposing posi-
tion of the other disputant) is a dispreferred act because it threatens the
positive face of the speaker, while disagreement protects it, in the sense
of Goffmann (1967) and Brown–Levinson (1987). As we have seen above,
proponents of the psychological approach to preference also refer to the
interpersonality principles of mutual protection of face, the politeness
principle, and politeness strategies.
At this point, let us make a detour and take another look at the pref-
erence structure of adjacency pairs investigated by Bilmes (1988), where
in the first pair part the speaker attributes some kind of thought or ac-
tion to the co-conversant. In this kind of adjacency pair disagreement
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is the preferred response while agreement is dispreferred, since a lack of
utterance equals agreement and not disagreement. Let us notice, how-
ever, (and this is something Bilmes does not point out) that the thought
or action attributed to the co-conversant can be of any kind—not only
positive or negative but also neutral—but this does not affect the pre-
ferred status of disagreement at all. In the case of a neutral statement it
is not plausible to account for the preferred status of disagreement and
the dispreferred status of agreement with face work.
Bilmes (1991, 465) points out that many, perhaps most of the state-
ments we make that could potentially be agreed or disagreed with are
made without an expectation of expressions of either agreement or dis-
agreement; in such cases it is agreement that is presumed (although not
expected), and it is disagreement that is preferred (according to the in-
ference rule of preference).
In my opinion, in the case of neutral statements, which do not di-
rectly affect the face of the participants, it is primarily the truth of the
propositional content of the utterance which is at stake. This, I believe,
is largely true of disputes as well: we cannot accept as the only expla-
nation the claim that in disputes disagreement is triggered solely by the
speaker’s desire to defend his/her point of view (and, through it, his/
her face). Equally important, or perhaps even more important, is the
motivation to uncover the truth in the course of the dispute.
The main point I want to make with all of this is that in our inves-
tigations of norms and principles that explain preference, besides inter-
personality principles, we should not forget about rationality principles.
Grice’s Maxim of Quality (Grice 1975)—a classic rationality prin-
ciple—is of crucial importance in explaining the preferred status of dis-
agreement in adjacency pairs involving a (counter)statement in their first
part. The Maxim of Relevance (Grice, ibid.), too, contributes to explain-
ing the preference structure of adjacency pairs in verbal conflicts: the
absence of an irrelevancy claim20 triggers the inference that the speaker
agrees with his/her partner(s) in finding the previous claim to be relevant
to the discussion at hand. Further rationality principles which can be
connected with preference organization are Levinson’s (2000) I-Principle
and Q-Principle.
In his latest book about generalized conversational implicatures and
the rationality principles underlying them, Levinson (2000) does not dis-
20 For more details, see Muntigl–Turnbull (1998).
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cuss preference organization, nevertheless he makes remarkable obser-
vations on the level at which systematic pragmatic inferences must be
explicated21 as well as on the manifestation of the I-Principle in a phe-
nomenon examined by conversation analysts.
Exploring I-inferences generated by the operation of the Principle
of Informativeness (the I-Principle for short), Levinson (2000, 112–5)
cites the pattern of self-identifications over the telephone observed by
Schegloff (see section 2.3), where intimates expect their identity to be
conveyed just by the sample of voice quality in their first Hello, only
escalating step by step, when overt recognition is withheld, with further
examples of voice quality, then nicknames or firstnames. The I-Principle
(a rendition of Grice’s Q2 maxim: do not make your contribution more
informative than is required) is formulated as follows: “Say as little as
necessary, that is, produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient
to achieve your communicational ends (bearing Q in mind)”22 (Levinson
2000, 114). Schegloff (1979) attributed the dispreferred status of overt
self-identifications to social psychological motivation. In my opinion, face
saving and a tendency towards economy, i.e., interpersonality and ratio-
nality principles, seem always to be at work simultaneously in the course
of communication.
Levinson’s First (Q-) Heuristic (Levinson 2000, 35) — “what isn’t
said, isn’t” — is related to Grice’s first Maxim of Quantity, Q1: make
your contribution as informative as is required. Levinson’s Q-Principle
(developed from the First Heuristic) is formulated as follows: “Do not
provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge
of the world allows, unless providing an informationally stronger state-
ment would contravene the I-Principle. Specifically, select the informa-
tionally strongest paradigmatic alternate that is consistent with the facts”
21 In contrast to the standard view, according to which there are only two levels
of meaning, Levinson (2000, 22–3) assumes three levels of meaning: (i) sentence-
meaning, (ii) utterance-token-meaning, and (iii) a level of meaning between the
first two, i.e., utterance-type-meaning. Sentence-meaning must be explicated by
a theory of grammar, utterance-token-meaning (or speaker-meaning) is a mat-
ter of actual nonce inferences made in actual contexts by actual recipients. At
the level of utterance-type-meaning systematic pragmatic inferences independent
of particular contexts can be captured. These systematic pragmatic inferences,
such as preference organization, among others, are based not on direct computa-
tions about speaker-intentions but on general expectations about how language
is normally used.
22 See the definition of Q in the next paragraph.
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(Levinson 2000, 76). Considering this, Sacks’s classic “dinner” example
(see section 2.2) and similar phenomena can obviously be analysed as
generalized conversational implicatures induced by the Q-Principle.
According to Németh T. (2003, 248; 2004, 410), the rationality prin-
ciples guide information transmission and interpretation with reference
to the object. This kind of information, expressed explicitly or implic-
itly, is basically propositional in nature. Interpersonality principles reg-
ulate information transmission and processing on selves including the
communicative partners’ desires, wishes, aims, etc. This kind of infor-
mation does not necessarily have a propositional form, sometimes it can
hardly be propositionalized. Considering this, Gruber’s (1998) investi-
gations confirm the assumption that rationality principles are crucial in
explaining preference structure in verbal conflict sequences, inasmuch as
he proves that the more vehement the dispute is, the more important the
propositional content and the thematic cohesion of the turns are.
We have now run a full circle. My answer to the question what we
should understand by preference is, then, this: I understand preference
as a phenomenon which is motivated by rationality and interpersonality
principles and manifested in the norms of linguistic behaviour, and whose
mechanism is described by an inference rule.
From the perspective of the above argumentation it seems plausible
to interpret the linguistic means called dispreference markers in the classic
works of CA and reluctance markers since Bilmes (1988) on the basis of
interpersonality and rationality principles together. Without any doubt,
reluctance markers play a role in protecting the face of the partner. In the
case of a critical discussion—especially a sharp one—it would be strange,
however, to state that any one of the markers—for instance, the agree-
ment component as a preface of an utterance realizing disagreement—
serves exclusively or even just primarily the purpose of expressing polite-
ness and protecting the face of the partner. In such cases it is equally (if
not more) important to clash positions and arguments, and the proposi-
tional content of the agreement component is also important in addition
to its interpersonal effect. In the use of all the discussed markers the
weighing of the propositional content of the utterance is most likely to
play a role. The same is true for explanations and justifications provided
in the same turn as a disagreement—these are also included among dis-
preference markers (although not among reluctance markers)—since an
explanation or a justification used as an argument is an important ele-
ment of the content of the dispute. We can suppose, then, that on the
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basis of the principles of communicative language use discussed a com-
prehensive description of general validity can be provided about the use
of these markers. An attempt at providing such a description, however,
is beyond the scope of the present paper.
3.6. Statistical distribution
In the course of dispute, due to the nature of the phenomenon, preferred
disagreement is most likely to be more frequent than dispreferred agree-
ment is, since as soon as the opposite is the case, we can no longer speak of
dispute. Frequency distribution agrees with preferential structure in the
case of verbal conflicts. The data of the investigated corpus support this:
it contains 203 turns realizing disagreement and only 34 turns realizing
agreement. This, however, does not mean that the frequency distribution
correlates with preferential status in the case of every sequence type.
4. Summary
In the present paper I have attempted to clarify the nature of preference
considering that the use of this classical concept of conversation analysis
seems to have become confused in the course of time.
After discussing the scope of preference in CA, I have first demon-
strated Sacks’s original concept of preference. Then, rewieving changes
in the interpretation of the concept, I have studied the attempts aimed at
defining it, categorizing them as structural, social psychological, statis-
tical and complex approaches. I have argued for the complex approach,
suggesting a new interpretation of preference which unifies the different
views from the perspective of pragmatic principles. I have attributed
the various aspects of preference to the joint manifestation of the in-
terpersonality principles regulating the interpersonal relationships of the
speakers (such as the principle of saving face, the politeness principle and
politeness strategies) and rationality principles directed at the object of
the utterance (such as Grice’s Maxim of Quality and Maxim of Rele-
vance, Levinson’s Q-Principle and I-Principle). I have emphasized that
the maxims of quality and relevance play a crucial role in understanding
the preference structure of adjacency pairs involving a counterstatement
in their first part.
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I have investigated preference structure and markedness in a corpus
of transcribed conversations from debate programs on Hungarian radio
and television in order to interpret the concept of preference with regard
to its context sensitivity and to arrive at a carefully argued conclusion on
the issue of the correlation of preference and markedness. After discussing
examples, I have demonstrated in tables the distribution of unmarked and
marked realizations of agreement vs. disagreement in the corpus. The
results have confirmed the assumption known in the literature but not
checked in a corpus that preference does not correlate with markedness,
consequently the markers investigated are not dispreference markers but
reluctance markers.
Finally, I have proposed a new approach to reluctance markers to
interpret them on the basis of interpersonality and rationality principles
together.
Appendix
1. The data of the corpus
Discourse transcribed from audiotapes:
1. radio programs
LDI1: Let’s discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár.
26 March 1998.
31 turns, 1061 words
LDI2: Let’s discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár.
26 March 1998.
23 turns, 1032 words
LDI3: Let’s discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár.
26 March 1998.
79 turns, 973 words
LDI4: Let’s discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár.
26 March 1998.
48 turns, 779 words
LDI5: Let’s discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár.
7 April 1999.
21 turns, 719 words
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LDI6: Let’s discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár.
7 April 1999.
36 turns, 1058 words
LDI7: Let’s discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár.
22 April 1999.
53 turns, 960 words
LDI8: Let’s discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár.
22 April 1999.
43 turns, 1297 words
LDI9: Let’s discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár.
22 April 1999.
27 turns, 830 words
LDI10: Let’s discuss it (Beszéljük meg!) Program by György Bolgár.
22 April 1999.
40 turns, 1015 words
In all conversations: GYB: György Bolgár; C: caller
2. television programs
TOP: Topical (Aktuális). 6 July, 2001. János Betlen talking to Gyu-
la Thürmer, President of the Workers’ Party.
122 turns, 3475 words
JB: János Betlen; GYT: Gyula Thürmer
P&C: Pros and cons (Pro és kontra). Debate between Imre Kerényi
and Ilona Kocsi. 5 September, 2002.
121 turns, 4383 words
IKe: Imre Kerényi; IKo: Ilona Kocsi
2. Transcription conventions
((coughs)) double parantheses: certain meaningful (mostly non-ver-
bal) details of the scene
(.) micropause; potentially significant but very short pause,
comparable to the duration of an average syllable
(2.0) measured pause (in seconds)
– dash: a short unmeasured pause within an utterance
lehet underline: emphasis
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nem left-hand bracket: the point at which an ongoing utter-
ance is joined by another
[
persze
= equal signs are used to link different parts of a single
speaker’s utterance when those parts constitute a con-
tinuous flow of speech that has been carried over to an-
other line, by transcript design, to accommodate an in-
tervening interruption when there is no interval between
adjacent utterances; an equal sign also signals a lack of
pause or overlap between two utterances
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